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COVID-19’s Impacts on the
Labor Market in 2020
Brad J. Hershbein and Harry J. Holzer
ARTICLE HIGHLIGHTS
n COVID-19 decimated the
U.S. labor market in the spring
of 2020; a partial recovery in
the summer and early fall left
historically marginalized and
economically disadvantaged
groups largely behind, more
than in any previous recession.
n Blacks and Hispanics have
had slower employment
recoveries than whites, even
accounting for differences in
education and occupation.
n States hit harder by
COVID earlier on continue
to lag behind in their
employment recovery.

ALSO IN THIS ISSUE
Making the Child Care
Tax Credit Permanently
Refundable Could Benefit
Low-Income Families
Gabrielle Pepin
page 5

Inviting Submissions for the
2021 Dissertation Award
page 8

W.E. Upjohn Institute
Welcomes Beth Truesdale
page 9

It is no secret that in the spring of 2020 the
COVID-19 pandemic disrupted U.S. labor markets
more severely and more quickly than at any point
in living memory. A blizzard of research papers,
newspaper stories, and calls for economic relief
have documented the severe crash in employment
in the spring of 2020, and the disproportionate
burden borne by workers in leisure and
accommodation, workers of color, and workers
unable to do their jobs remotely. Far less is known,
however, about how employment trajectories
have played out for diferent groups over the
rest of 2020, as a nascent recovery frst gathered
steam and then stalled, and how these patterns
varied across states that difered in the timing
and severity of their outbreaks and economic
restrictions.
In a recent working paper, we draw on publicly
available data on detailed employment measures,
COVID case rates and mortality, and state
restriction policies to shed light on how labor
markets have evolved since the pandemic began,
capturing trends through the end of 2020. We fnd
that the overall jobs recovery fatlined in October,
as caseloads and mortality rose sharply, but that
this aggregate pause obscured a continuation
of slow gains among higher-paid workers and
a second, if much milder, drop among lowerpaid workers. We also confrm that Blacks and
Hispanics not only had larger initial employment
losses in the spring, but that their employment
recoveries lagged over the summer and early fall.
Even when we control for diferences in education
and type of occupation, these racial gaps persist,
although by year’s end there was convergence for
Blacks even as the gap for Hispanics began to grow
again. Permanent job loss has also been higher
among these groups.
In addition to these disparities by race, we also
fnd large and persistent disparities in employment

trends across states. Grouping states into three
categories based on when their caseloads frst
peaked, we document that employment recoveries
have lagged among states that had the earliest
outbreaks, and that the share of their populations
with permanent job loss has increased the most.
Delving into the reasons for this dispersion,
we show that while economic restrictions hurt

Compared to prepandemic,
about 10 million more people
were jobless by December 2020,
and another 2 million had their
work hours reduced.
employment when they are in place, their negative
impact quickly fades once they are relaxed. Rather,
elevated mortality rates depress employment not
only contemporaneously but for months aferward,
most likely because a greater number of deaths is a
highly visible and persistent signal for the dangers
of engaging in economic activity that drives both
jobs and the risk of infection. Unfortunately, the
rise in mortality rates that occurred at the end of
2020 will likely create headwinds for continued
employment recovery in 2021.
To ofset these headwinds and increase the
chances that the recovery is broad and inclusive,
we propose a series of policies to provide fnancial
assistance to the workers hit hardest by the
pandemic and to help reskill workers whose
jobs are unlikely to return. However, any robust
recovery will require eforts to control the spread
of the virus in the immediate future, including
accelerated vaccination, more widespread and
inexpensive testing, and increased incentives for
mask wearing and physical distancing.
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Figure 1 Labor Market Indicators over 2020
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NOTE: The employment rate is the share of non-institutionalized civilians aged 18–64 who report being employed,
except for those who report being absent from work for unspecifed reasons (many of whom are believed by the U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics to have been misclassifed and are actually unemployed). The modifed employment rate
excludes individuals who report being employed part-time involuntarily. Total weekly hours is the sum of all hours
worked by people during the reference week of the survey.
SOURCE: Current Population Survey; authors’ calculations.

2020 Labor Market Trends

Figure 1 presents three indicators of
aggregate employment over the course
of 2020. Te red line with circles shows
the employment rate of people aged
18–64—the share of these people with
jobs—although we have adjusted this
number slightly to exclude individuals
who reported being absent from work
for unspecifed reasons. (Te U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics believes
many of this latter group should have
been classifed as unemployed instead.)
Starting above 75 percent prior to the
pandemic, the employment rate dips
in March before plummeting over 13
percentage points in April, gradually
recovering to 71 percent by October
and budging little over the next two
months. Nearly 10 million fewer
Americans had a job in December than
in February 2020.
However, this doesn’t capture the
full scope of the employment loss, as

2

employment rate, suggesting that this
employment rate is a good proxy for
the strength of the labor market.

many workers have kept their jobs but
had their hours reduced involuntarily.
Tus, the blue line with squares
presents a modifed employment
rate that excludes individuals who
are involuntarily part time. Te gap
between this measure of employment
and the frst one is 1.5 percentage
points in January and February, but
it widens substantially by April to
4.7 percentage points, and even in
December is still 2.6 percentage points.
Tis means that, in addition to the
approximately 10 million fewer people
without a job, another 2 million are
employed but working fewer hours
than before the pandemic. Finally,
the dashed black line shows the total
number of hours worked per week
across all Americans. Tis metric
has fallen from 5.6 billion in early
2020 to 5.15 billion as of December, a
decline of 8.4 percent, about the same
percentage decline as the modifed

Tis overall recovery, anemic as
it is, has not been felt equally by all
workers. Te two panels in Figure 2
break out trends by occupational wage
quartile. Each quartile represents a
fourth of workers based on the average
hourly wage in their occupation, with
1 being the lowest and 4 being the
highest. Panel A shows the modifed
employment rate, as in Figure 1.
Although lower wage quartiles have
always had lower employment rates,
the gap surged afer the pandemic
began. Te modifed employment rate
of the frst wage quartile plummeted
by an astonishing 35 percentage points
between February and April, before
rebounding about two-thirds of the
way back by October. Workers in
higher wage quartiles sufered much
smaller losses, with those in the top
quartile down only 2 percentage
points from the beginning of 2020
by year’s end, and those in the third
quartile down 6 percentage points.
While modifed employment rates
continued to rise slightly between
November and December for the top
two wage quartiles, they reversed
course and fell slightly for the bottom
two quartiles. Tese losses occurred
simultaneously with rising COVID
caseloads and mortality and renewed
economic restrictions, particularly in
the hospitality and leisure sector, which
has many low-paying occupations.
Panel B in Figure 2 examines the
share of the population who report
sufering permanent job loss (that is,
they lost a job and do not consider
themselves on temporary layof).
Research has found that such longterm job separation predicts lower
earnings and higher health risks even
decades later (Ruhm 1991; Eliason and
Storrie 2006; Sullivan and Von Wachter
2009). In winter 2020, these shares
clustered around half a percent for all
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wage quartiles. Tey rose sharply and
diverged, particularly over the summer
and fall, with the share peaking at 3.2
percent in October for the bottom
quartile. Te slight dips seen in
December are not necessarily good
news—because modifed employment
rates also fell for the bottom quartiles
(panel A), it’s likely that workers in the
bottom quartile were leaving the labor
force entirely rather than fnding a new
job.

Recovery Lags for Black and
Hispanic Workers

Te recovery in the modifed
employment rate has also varied
considerably by race and ethnicity.
Te solid red and blue lines in Figure
3 show the change in the employment
rate, in percentage points, for Blacks
and Hispanics since January 2020.
Hispanics initially fare the worst,
but Blacks also sufer greater initial
losses than other racial groups (solid
gray line). Hispanics have also had a
faster recovery, at least into the fall. By
December, racial gaps had narrowed,
especially for Blacks, although there
was some slippage for Hispanics.
Some of these racial gaps may be
due to education and occupational
diferences. Tus, in the dashed lines,
we statistically control for these
diferences. Tis reduces the gap
substantially between Blacks and
everyone else in the spring and early
summer, but plays a somewhat smaller
role aferward. Tese adjustments make
less of a diference for the gap with
Hispanics. Tus, not only have Blacks
and Hispanics had larger employment
losses and slower recoveries, the
bulk of these disparities—especially
for Hispanics—cannot be explained
by educational and occupational
diferences.

The Role of COVID Mortality and
Economic Restrictions

W.E. UPJOHN INSTITUTE

Figure 2 The Bottom Wage Quartile Has Had a Much Weaker Recovery Than the Top Quartile
Panel A: Modifed Employment Rate (%)
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NOTE: See note to Figure 1 for the defnition of the modifed employment rate. The permanent job loser share is the
share of the population (not just the unemployed) who report having lost a job and do not expect to be recalled.
The (hourly) wage quartiles are based on detailed occupation from Occupational Employment Statistics and are
population weighted; Q1 thus represents the bottom quarter of workers in terms of hourly pay, while Q4 represents
the top quarter.
SOURCE: Current Population Survey; Occupational Employment Statistics; authors’ calculations.

Employment rate losses and
recoveries also difer across states. We
fnd, for example, that states that had

3
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Figure 3 Blacks and Hispanics Have Experienced Slower Employment Rate Recoveries, Even after
Adjusting for Education and Occupation
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NOTE: See note to Figure 1 for the defnition of the modifed employment rate. Light, solid lines show the change, in
percentage points, of the modifed employment rate since January 2020 for each racial group. The darker, dashed lines
control for worker education and occupational wage quartile.
SOURCE: Current Population Survey; Occupational Employment Statistics; authors’ calculations.

initial COVID-19 caseload peaks in
the spring of 2020—the well-known
New York and New Jersey, but also
Minnesota, Virginia, and Colorado—
had deeper declines and less robust
recoveries than states that reached
their frst caseload peak only in the fall,
such as New Hampshire, Wisconsin,
and Oregon. A key question is how
COVID caseload and mortality
rates, as well as state restrictions on
economic activity—including stayat-home orders and bans on indoor
dining, among others—have afected
employment. Using regression analysis,
we fnd that current case rates are
positively associated with employment,
while current mortality rates and
the severity of current economic
restrictions reduce employment rates.
Tis likely refects the short-run tradeof between heightened economic
activity and greater virus transmission

4

when there are fewer restrictions.
However, we also fnd that there
are no lingering efects of economic
restrictions; once these are relaxed,
the employment rate bounces back.
On the other hand, we do fnd an
accumulating impact of COVID
mortality (but not caseloads) on
employment rates. By December, a
state with 100 more total deaths per
100,000 people—about the diference
between the 90th percentile (Rhode
Island; 131.8 deaths per 100,000
people) and the 10th percentile (Utah;
28.6 deaths per 100,000)—would be
expected to have an employment rate
3 percentage points lower, everything
else equal. Te surge in mortality rates
that occurred nationwide in November
2020 through January 2021 thus could
pose a looming threat to continued
economic recovery in 2021.

Conclusion

Te labor market recovery from
the COVID-19 recession was brief
and uneven in 2020, leaving behind
workers disadvantaged by race,
ethnicity, and economic status. As
cases ebb and fow around the country,
states that have sufered—or will
sufer—numerous COVID deaths
may experience a slower recovery
through 2021. An equitable and
broad economic recovery will need
a rapid and comprehensive vaccine
rollout, but we argue in the paper
for several additional policies to
spur employment. Tese should
include fscal relief for state and local
governments to stave of further cuts,
wage insurance programs for those
who struggle to fnd new jobs, and
enhanced funding for sectoral training
and community college education for
industries and occupations that will
continue to grow, such as construction,
health care, and IT.
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Making the Child Care
Tax Credit Permanently
Refundable Could Beneft
Low-Income Families
Gabrielle Pepin
Te Child and Dependent Care
Credit (CDCC), a tax credit based
on income and child care expenses,
subsidizes child care costs for working
families. Te federal CDCC is available
to households with children younger
than 13 in which all parents have
positive annual earnings. While many
families meet these criteria, from its
introduction in 1976 through 2020,
the CDCC was nonrefundable, so
only families with positive tax liability
afer other deductions benefted. Tis
generally precluded very-low-income
families from receiving CDCC benefts,
and many policymakers advocated
making the credit refundable. In
response to the COVID-19 pandemic,
the American Rescue Plan Act of
2021 made the CDCC refundable and
increased its generosity during tax
year 2021 only. I estimate how CDCC
eligibility, benefts, and marginal tax
rates would change for diferent groups
if the credit were made permanently
refundable.

Using data from the Survey of
Income and Program Participation,
which documents income,
demographics, and child care expenses
of U.S. households, I fnd that making
the CDCC permanently refundable
would lead to relatively large increases
in eligibility among single-parent,
Black, and Hispanic households,
which are all less likely to qualify for
the nonrefundable credit. Specifcally,
some 3 percent of Black households, 2
percent of Hispanic households, and
1 percent of white households would
gain eligibility, all else equal. About
5 percent of single parents would
gain eligibility and receive on average
over $1,000 in benefts annually. Tis
increase is substantial, constituting
18 percent of existing child care
spending and 10 percent of adjusted
gross income (AGI). Nevertheless,
refundability would generate small
increases in marginal tax rates for some
moderate-income taxpayers. Making
the CDCC permanently refundable

ARTICLE HIGHLIGHTS
n The Child and Dependent Care Credit (CDCC) subsidizes child care costs for working families.
n In 2021, the CDCC was made temporarily refundable, so even families with no
positive tax liability after other deductions could benefit.
n If refundability were made permanent, around 5 percent of single parents would
gain eligibility and receive on average over $1,000 per year in benefits.
n Permanent refundability would also lead to large increases in eligibility among
Black and Hispanic households.
n Some moderate-income taxpayers would experience small increases in marginal
tax rates.

would increase government spending
each year by about $800 million, or 21
percent of CDCC spending during the
late 2010s.

How Does the CDCC Work?

Congress implemented the CDCC
in 1976 and expanded it in 1981 and
2001. Te latter expansion took efect
in 2003, and between 2003 and 2020,
households were able to claim up to
$3,000 worth of child care expenses
per year for each of up to two children
younger than 13. Such households
could receive a tax credit worth up to

If the CDCC were made
permanently refundable,
low-income taxpayers would
receive larger benefts.
35 percent of those expenses, up to
$1,050 per child. Beginning at $15,000
in AGI, the beneft rate decreased by
1 percentage point for each additional
$2,000 until it remained at 20 percent
for those with $43,000 or more in AGI,
who could receive up to $600 per child
in benefts. Te CDCC, however, was
nonrefundable, so taxpayers without
positive tax liability were ineligible.
Moreover, CDCC claimants must
work to qualify for benefts, including
both spouses among married taxpayers
fling jointly. Additionally, if either
spouse’s earnings are less than child
care expenditures, the CDCC is capped
by the pay of the lower-earning spouse.
Almost any child care expenditures
are eligible for the credit, except care
provided by a noncustodial parent,
but to claim the credit, taxpayers
must list their earnings, child care
expenditures, and child care providers’
tax identifcation or Social Security
numbers.

How Would Permanent Refundability
Afect CDCC Eligibility and Benefts?
Nonrefundability generates a
diference between statutory and

5
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actual benefts received. In Figure
1, I compare maximum efective
CDCC benefts with and without
refundability as of 2020.1 Taxpayers’
incomes must exceed the tax fling
threshold of $18,650 to be eligible for
nonrefundable benefts. For taxpayers
with incomes above this threshold,
nonrefundable benefts (red lines)
increase with income before reaching
peaks of about $860 at $27,600 in
AGI for households with one eligible
child and $1,530 at $34,100 in AGI for
households with two or more eligible
children. Benefts then decrease until
they plateau at $600 per child for
taxpayers with $43,000 or more in
income.
Figure 1 also shows that if the
CDCC were made permanently
refundable (blue lines), low-income
taxpayers would receive larger benefts.
For very-low-income taxpayers,
refundable benefts increase as income
increases and then hold steady at
$1,050 per child at incomes up to

$15,000. For taxpayers with AGI
above $15,000, refundable benefts
steadily fall as income increases until
they converge with nonrefundable
benefts. Hence, making the CDCC
permanently refundable would
increase generosity among low-income
taxpayers without afecting benefts for
those with higher incomes.

How Would Permanent Refundability
Afect Work Decisions?

As a subsidy for child care,
CDCC benefts encourage child care
spending and efectively increase
wages net of child care costs. Since all
parents must work to receive benefts,
increases in benefts promote labor
force participation. However, the
CDCC generates complex work hours
incentives. To examine how making the
CDCC permanently refundable would
afect work hours, I compare marginal
tax rates with respect to income—the
taxes that parents would owe on an
additional dollar of income—with

Figure 1 Maximum Federal CDCC Benefts by Federal AGI
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NOTE: The fgure shows expected federal CDCC benefts for households with one (dashed line) or two or more
(solid line) eligible children as of 2020. The maximum credit with refundability is shown in blue and without
refundability is shown in red.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations using federal tax forms.
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and without refundability. When
marginal tax rates increase, the value
of an additional dollar of earnings
falls, which discourages parents from
working more.
Figure 2 displays these marginal
tax rates for households with the
maximum qualifying child care
expenditures as of 2020.2 Panel A,
which shows marginal tax rates for
single parents with one eligible child,
indicates that making the CDCC
permanently refundable would
decrease marginal tax rates by 35
percentage points for those with less
than $3,000 in AGI. (Marginal tax
rates are already negative in this range,
implying that an additional dollar of
earnings is worth more than a dollar
because of the credit.) Refundability
would not afect marginal tax rates
for single parents between incomes
of $3,000 and $15,000, but it would
increase rates by 1.5 percentage points
between incomes of $15,000 and
$25,000 and by 11.5 percentage points
between incomes of $25,000 and
$33,000.
Marginal tax rates for married
parents with two eligible children,
depicted in Panel B of Figure 2, exhibit
a similar pattern. Tus, a permanently
refundable CDCC would reduce
marginal tax rates for households
with very low incomes, incentivizing
increases in their work hours, but
it would increase marginal tax rates
for households with low to moderate
incomes, discouraging their work
hours.

As refundability has diferent
impacts on tax rates across the
income distribution, which
households would likely beneft from
a permanently refundable CDCC?
To answer the question, I simulate
impacts of refundability, drawing
on the 2018 Survey of Income and
Program Participation for taxpayer
characteristics and child care spending
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23 percent are ineligible for the
nonrefundable CDCC, another 23
percent fall in the phase-in region of
the CDCC, where benefts increase as
income rises, and the remaining 54
percent fall in the phase-out/plateau
region of the credit, where benefts
decrease or remain constant as income
rises. Households in the ineligible and
phase-in regions on average spend
about $6,000 and $11,000 per year,

low to qualify for the nonrefundable
CDCC but would become eligible if
refundability led them to pay for child
care. Tese results suggest permanent
CDCC refundability would decrease
eligibility gaps between whites and
underrepresented groups.
Permanent refundability would also
change beneft amounts for diferent
families. Among single parents who
work and already pay for child care,

Figure 2 Marginal Tax Rates for Diferent Families by CDCC Refundability
Panel A: Single with One Child
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Panel B: Married with Two Children
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among households with children
younger than 13. Te data allow me
to estimate CDCC eligibility rates by
family structure and race and observe
how permanent refundability would
afect CDCC benefts and marginal
tax rates across households that face
diferent child care and labor supply
incentives.
I fnd that 15 percent of single
parents and 19 percent of married
parents are eligible for nonrefundable
CDCC benefts. About 5 percent of
single parents have incomes too low to
qualify for the nonrefundable benefts
but would become eligible if the credit
were made permanently refundable.
Another 56 percent of single parents
would gain eligibility if refundability
led them to pay for child care. Te
remaining 25 percent of single parents
do not work and have incomes too
low to qualify for the nonrefundable
CDCC. Among married parents,
10 percent have incomes too low to
qualify for the nonrefundable CDCC,
but virtually none of these households
pay for child care and therefore would
remain ineligible under a refundable
credit. Most married parents are
ineligible for the CDCC because they
do not pay for child care or one of the
parents does not work.
CDCC eligibility rates also vary
by parents’ race and ethnicity. Black
and Hispanic households, which tend
to have lower incomes, are less likely
than white households to be eligible for
the nonrefundable CDCC. Whereas
21 percent of white households are
eligible, only 17 percent of Black
households and 13 percent of Hispanic
households are eligible. Making the
CDCC permanently refundable
would increase eligibility by about
3 percentage points among Black
households, by about 2 percentage
points among Hispanic households,
and by about 1 percentage point among
white households. Another 14 percent
of Black households, 8 percent of
Hispanic households, and 7 percent
of white households have incomes too

W.E. UPJOHN INSTITUTE
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NOTE: The fgure shows marginal tax rates with respect to AGI under the federal CDCC, Child Tax Credit, Earned
Income Tax Credit, and federal individual income tax schedule as of 2020, assuming the CDCC is nonrefundable
or refundable.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations using TAXSIM and federal tax forms.
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respectively, on child care. If the CDCC
were made permanently refundable,
average annual benefts would increase
from $0 to $1,037 in the ineligible
region and from $617 to $1,249 in the
phase-in region. Tese increases are
substantial: in the ineligible region,
the increase constitutes 18 percent of
existing child care spending and 10
percent of AGI. In the phase-in region,
it constitutes 6 percent of child care
spending and 3 percent of AGI.
Tese beneft increases also afect
marginal tax rates. In the ineligible
region, the average marginal tax rate
on an additional dollar of income
would fall by 5 percentage points under
refundability, while in the phase-in
and phase-out/plateau regions it would
rise by about 2 percentage points.
However, the benefts also subsidize
the cost of child care, efectively

W.E. UPJOHN INSTITUTE

making it cheaper. For households
in the ineligible region, the efective
(postsubsidy) cost of an additional
dollar of child care spending decreases
by 16 percent. In the phase-in and
phase-out/plateau regions, the cost
decreases by 9 and 4 cents on the
dollar, respectively. Tus, moderateincome households have slightly higher
marginal tax rates on their incomes
ofset by cheaper child care costs, with
the latter possibly mitigating work
disincentives caused by the former.

How Would Permanent Refundability
Afect Government Spending?

Finally, CDCC beneft increases
under refundability would increase
government spending. If all households
with beneft increases were to claim
the CDCC, making it permanently
refundable would increase government

spending annually by about $800
million, or about 22 percent of total
CDCC spending in the late 2010s.
Notes
1. I assume single taxpayers fle as head-ofhousehold, married taxpayers fle jointly,
and all income comes from earnings among
very-low-income taxpayers.
2. I assume households do not have older
children, all income comes from earnings,
and married parents have equal earnings,
though results are similar for married
parents with unequal earnings.
For additional details, see the working
paper at https://research.upjohn.org/
up_workingpapers/344.

Gabrielle Pepin is a postdoctoral researcher at the
Upjohn Institute.

Inviting Submissions for the 2021 Dissertation Award
Te W.E. Upjohn Institute for
Employment Research invites
submissions for its 27th annual prize
for the best PhD dissertation on
employment-related issues.
A frst prize of $2,500 is being
ofered. Up to two honorable mention
awards of $1,000 may also be given.
Te Institute supports and conducts
policy-relevant research on issues
related to employment, unemployment,
and social insurance programs. Te
dissertation award furthers this
mission. Te dissertation may come
from any academic discipline, but it
must have a substantial policy focus.
Dissertations will be evaluated by a
panel of economists using the following
criteria:
• Policy relevance
• Technical quality of the research
• Presentation
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Any person whose dissertation has
been accepted during the 24-month
period from July 1, 2019 to June 30,
2021 is eligible for the 2021 prize.
Te deadline for submission is July
5, 2021. Applicants must upload a 10page summary of the dissertation, CV,
and a letter of endorsement from their
dissertation advisor at: https://www
.upjohn.org/form/dissertation-award.
Applicants are advised that they will
need to supply a copy of their entire
dissertation if they are selected as a
fnalist, and they may apply for the
award only once.
Additional information may
be obtained by contacting us at
communications@upjohn.org.
Information is also available at https://
www.upjohn.org/about/grants-awards/
dissertation-award.
Visit https://research.upjohn.org/
dissertation_awards/ for a complete list

of award winners and summaries of
their dissertations.

Recent Winners 2020
First Prize
Claire Montialoux
ENSAE Paris Tech-CREST
Polytechnique
Honorable Mentions
Jonas Cederlöf
Uppsala University
John Grigsby
University of Chicago

W.E. Upjohn Institute Welcomes Beth Truesdale
Te Upjohn Institute is excited to
announce that Beth C. Truesdale will be
joining its research team this summer.

Currently a research associate at
the Harvard Center for Population and
Development Studies, Truesdale is a

sociologist specializing in issues of income
inequality and how the changing nature
of work afects worker wellbeing and
retirement decisions. A Rhodes Scholar,
Truesdale earned bachelor’s and master’s
degrees from the University of Oxford before
earning her doctorate in sociology from
Harvard University.
Upjohn Institute President Michael
Horrigan lauded the expertise and
perspective Truesdale brings to the Institute.
“Her focal areas and her experience with
case studies, ethnographic research, and
public policy make Beth a wonderful
complement to other Institute researchers
and will help us serve our mission of
promoting employment strategies and good
jobs for all,” Horrigan said.
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